This paper is an attempt to draw distinctive lines between the concepts of cybercrime, cyber-attack, and cyber warfare in the current information age, in which it has become difficult to separate the activities of transnational criminals from acts of belligerents using cyberspace. The paper considers the implications of transnational cyber threats in international humanitarian law (IHL) with a particular focus on cyber-attacks by non-state actors, the principles of state responsibility, and the implications of targeting non-state perpetrators under IHL. It concludes that current international law constructs are inadequate to address the implications of transnational cyber threats; the author recommends consequential amendments to the laws of war in order to address the challenges posed by transnational cyber threats.
DRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN CYBERCRIME, CYBER-ATTACK AND CYBER WARFARE
The terms 'cybercrime', 'cyber-attack', and 'cyber-warfare' have often been used interchangeably without much consideration given to their conceptual meanings, depth and scope. Indeed, the trio is interrelated. Since the beginning of this millennium, the line dividing these triad concepts has been stretched almost to a breaking point. This absence of clarity has so far hindered attempts to fashion out meaningful legal responses to transnational activities related to any one of them. A single cyber activity today may constitute any of these threats depending on who initiated the act, the targeted infrastructure and the intention of the perpetrator.
For instance, cyber-attacks are most often initiated using processes that in different circumstances may constitute cybercrime. However, cyber warfare must be initiated by a prior cyber-attack. In fact, it is difficult to say for sure that a particular cyber threat is an attack that necessitates military response by way of self-defence or bilateral (multilateral) criminal investigation and cooperation to dislodge a transnational threat. To understand the interrelatedness of these concepts, it is necessary to consider them separately.
CYBER-ATTACK
Just as activities that constitute cyber-attack are spread across a wide spectrum of the threat environment known as cyberspace, 3 the definition of cyberattack itself also varies depending on the perspective of the person defining it.
other hand, compromises the programme language on the targeted computer system or network causing it to interpret commands differently thereby affecting the correctness of the information processed or reacted to by the operating 
CYBER CRIME
The term 'cybercrime' has also proven difficult to define, 20 although some features of the crime are widely acknowledged. For instance, cybercrime may only be committed by a non-state actor, 21 by means of a computer system and must have violated a state penal provision or international criminal law. 22 The crime does not seek to undermine the functions of a computer network, or possess a political or national security purpose. 23 Instead, cybercrime is defined simply as "any crime 16 Ibid.: 140. 17 Martin C. Libicki, "What is Information Warfare?" Strategic Forum No. 28 (1995): 2. 18 Oona Hathaway, et al., supra note 13. 19 See Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. Knake, supra note 14, 9-10. See also Oona Hathaway, et al., supra note 13, 839 (noting that the US cyber operation was a command and control cyber-attack, which interfered with the Iraqi capacity to command and control its troops. Shortly before the Iraqi invasion of 2003, the US penetrated the Iraqi Ministry of Defence email system and succeeded in sending email messages to Iraqi soldiers to surrender peacefully. When the invasion commenced, US troops encountered little resistance and they discovered that military equipment were abandoned in the manner instructed in the email). 20 See Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, "On the Definition and Classification of Cybercrime," J. 23 Ibid., 834.
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This means that the concept of cybercrime is very broad, covering all sorts of criminal activities perpetrated in cyberspace including, cyber-squatting, online privacy, storage, dissemination of child pornography and other related offences.
The open-ended scope of cybercrimes and especially the wide spectrum of criminal activities in the cyberspace leads to conceptual complications between cybercrime and, particularly, cyber-attacks. Examples of some of the complexities between these two concepts for instance is where a person commits a cybercrime by hacking into an important national database of a country, say a museum or social security system, with a national security or political objective, but fails to actually undermine the database in the process. A second situation is where a nonstate actor commits an unlawful act through the use of computer network, which undermines the network but without a political or national security purpose. This can be presented in series of situations, such as where a person hacked a national database of a country, say a museum or national financial system, and in the process undermines the system in order to steal a precious national treasure and sell it for economic gain or steal credit cards. Another scenario could be where a non-state actor becomes involved in the online spreading of terrorist propaganda or distribution of child pornography without undermining the functions of the computer network, and not inspired by a political or national security purpose. These instances demonstrate the complexities and confusion that accompany an attempt to conceptually desegregate and distinguish between cyber-attack and cybercrime.
The Sony incident amply illustrates this difficulty. Sony Corporation in the US, a Japanese company with Headquarters in Tokyo, experienced an attack on its information technology systems on November 24, 2014, which destroyed data and workstations, and released internal emails and other materials. There were speculations that the attack was part of a "9/11-style" terrorist attack on theatres in the US scheduled to show the film 'The Interview', causing some theatres to cancel screenings and Sony to cancel its widespread release. The US Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) attributed the attacks on Sony's internet network and systems to the North Korean government, which denied any involvement, but praised a hacktivist group, called the "Guardians of Peace," for having done a "righteous deed". President Obama referred to the incident as an act of "cyber-vandalism," and publicly pledged to 24 Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, supra note 20: 14. In addition, some proposed definitions are broad enough to include not only all crimes committed by means of a computer, but also any crime in any way involving a computer as means or target. Debra Little, John Shinder, and Ed Tittel, supra note 20, 17 (referring to the Tenth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders' broad definition of "computer-related crime," as compared to its narrower, means-based definition of "computer crime"). ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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Unfortunately, these notions of cyber warfare limit the concept of 'war' strictly within an information technology space at the level of the computer systems and networks. 30 However, a broader understanding of the concept expands its application considerably beyond cyberspace, to include the kinetic effects which may result from cyber operations and attacks on the victim state's critical infrastructure. 31 Thus, Theohary and Rollins defined cyber warfare as "state-onstate action equivalent to an armed attack or use of force in cyberspace that may trigger a military response with a proportional kinetic use of force". 32 The concept is also conceptualised as cyber-attack that causes physical injury or property damage comparable to a conventional armed attack. 33 In this sense, cyber-warfare is distinctive because it first consists of a cyber-attack, which then leads to physical injury or property damage comparable to conventional armed attack. An excerpt from a book by a cyber security expert paints a picture of a typical cyber warfare scenario to include: 
NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSNATIONAL CYBER ATTACKS

CYBER-ATTACKS AND NON-STATE ACTORS
One of the challenges to the international legal order is the involvement of non-state actors in cyber-attacks. There is no question that this emerging category of international actors (non-state actors) perpetrates more cyber-attacks than states. 37 The main culprits appear to be international terrorist organisations, especially, al Qaeda. 38 For instance, in April 2010, the record of proceedings of a court in a case involving Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a suspected al Qaeda operative,
showed that the group had successfully conducted cyber-attacks, one of which was an attack on an Israeli government computer in 2001. 39 The accused revealed during interrogation that al Qaeda used the internet to launch computer attacks, 35 See Michael N. Schmitt, supra note 12, 75 (arguing that when a cyber-attack is carried out as part of an on-going armed conflict, IHL indisputably applies). 36 41 In addition, four terrorist organisations in the US -'Hammerskin Nation', 'Stormfront', 'Aryan Nation', and 'National Alliance' -have proven technology potentials to engage in cyber terrorism. 42 In Britain, authorities prepared for increased cyber-attacks due to the fact that al Qaeda called for a cyber-jihad as a result of the death of Osama bin Laden: 43 There will be more cyber terrorism. Groups will continue to benefit from the offthe-shelf technology in planning and conducting attacks, making operations more secure and potentially more lethal. The Internet and virtual space will be strategically vital. 44 Unfortunately, despite the increasing importance of non-state actors in international relations and their enormous potential to initiate serious cyberattacks, no provision is made in the international legal regime to govern such attacks. The existing rules have virtually nothing to say about non-state actors and cyber conflicts. 45 The UN Charter is only applicable to cyber-attack if such an attack was launched by a nation-state and the attack amounts to an armed attack. 46 Where a non-state actor (for instance a terrorist organisation) launches a cyberattack against a state actor (and vice-versa), the Charter would not apply because there are no specific provisions in the Charter addressing cyber-attacks, much less on cyber-attacks or armed attack by non-state actors.
APPLICATION OF EXTANT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) TO CYBER-ATTACKS
International humanitarian law is an aspect of international law also known as the laws of war or law of armed conflict. It consists of two distinct bodies of law:
jus ad bellum and jus in bello. The former consists of legal norms that govern conditions for resort to use of force in international law, including the prohibition of 40 Ibid. 46 See U.N. Charter, Article 2(4) and Article 51. VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017
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use of force and its exceptions, namely, the right of self-defence and authorisation by the UN Security Council. 47 The latter on the other hand, regulates the nature of force utilised in an armed conflict, which includes persons legitimately entitled to participate in armed conflict, the means and methods used and the rules of targeting. 48 To bring this body of law within the context of cyber-attacks, we must note as earlier explained that not all cyber-attacks amount to cyber warfare. Thus, where a cyber-attack falls short of use of force or armed attack, 49 the question that usually arises is whether such cyber-attack is governed by contemporary international humanitarian law (IHL) or jus in bello principles. To resolve this puzzle, it is important to determine the initial question whether a particular cyberattack may amount to an armed attack in the first place. Generally, this is not an easy task because of the absence of a concrete definition of 'armed attack' in the international law.
To begin with, the test proposed by Jean Pictet is quite instructive even though it relates more to finding out when an armed conflict exists. Under this test, . 49 The concepts of 'use of force' and 'armed attack' as contained in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter respectively, are neither defined in the Charter nor any other international instrument. However, the word 'attack' in international humanitarian law refers to a particular category of military operations. Under Article 49(1) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it is defined as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence". 'Use of force' on the other hand, from the perspective of jus ad bellum, is a broad concept, which does not necessarily require direct military violence. Thus, not every use of force constitutes an armed attack for the purpose of the exercise of the right of self-defence. See Michael N. Schmitt The first model is the 'instrument-based approach', which assesses whether the damage caused by a cyber-attack is such that can only be inflicted by a kinetic attack before the development of cyber capabilities. 56 If the damage is one that could only have been inflicted by kinetic attack prior to the advent of cyber capabilities, then it will be regarded as an armed attack. For instance, where a national power grid is shut down by means of cyber-attack, this would be regarded as armed attack because before the development of cyber capabilities shutting down of a national power grid could only be done through bombing or other forms of kinetic attack. 57 The second model, the 'effects-based approach', assesses the The 'Martens Clause' in the preamble to the Hague Convention IV of 1907 contains a similar provision:
Even in cases not explicitly covered by specific agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of principles of international law derived from established custom, principles of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience. 70 The implication of the above is that IHL principles of jus in bello apply where the effect of a cyber-attack brings the same consequence as the use of kinetic force. 71 Indeed, IHL rules clearly apply in a situation of armed conflict where cyberattacks are used in combination with kinetic weapons. 72 It is unclear, however, whether IHL would apply where a cyber-attack is the first or sole attack in the conflict. Nevertheless, to ascertain whether IHL applies, the overall effects of the cyber-attack must be taken into consideration. 73 81 The principle of 'distinction' or 'discrimination' requires that combatants and military objectives be distinguished from non-combatants and protected property or places. 83 The principle of humanity in jus in bello prohibits unnecessary suffering in the use of means and methods of warfare during hostilities. It also dictates that military force directed against combatants must avoid or minimise 'unnecessary suffering' of the victims. Thus, it is forbidden to employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering. 
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Nevertheless, these fundamental principles of jus in bello would apply where a state decides to respond to a cyber-attack by exercising its right of self-defence either by use of kinetic force or taking active defence measures, which may include electronic countermeasures designed to strike at an attacking computer system to halt an attack. 85 The use of active defence measures within cyberspace actually complies with the principle of military necessity because it offers the best option to shut down the attacking computer system. 86 However, the use of kinetic weapons in self-defence as response to cyber-attack may not be very effective in dislodging an on-going cyber-attack and would almost always amount to a disproportionate use of force, which offends the jus in bello principle of proportionality. Regarding the principles of humanity (avoidance of unnecessary suffering) and distinction, the trace back capabilities of active defence measures would ensure that only the source of the cyber-attack is targeted thus reducing collateral damage. The specific computer systems, network and cyber infrastructure used to initiate the cyberattack is a direct and legitimate military objective rather than the use of kinetic force to target perpetrators who may not be distinguishable from civilians. 87 The use of active defence measures (using cyberspace) as an option of the exercise of self-defence, however, has its shortcomings in the application of IHL to cyber warfare. The technicalities and responsibility involved in tracing an attack pattern in cyberspace routed through intermediary systems is huge. This not only takes time but also gives room for identity mistakes, especially if the attacker terminates the electronic connection that allowed him access to cyberspace. 88 Any measures taken in active defence against a wrong intermediary system is definitely contrary to the jus in bello principle of distinction. 89 However, if the tracing is successful, the attacking systems must still be properly mapped for active defence measures to be initiated specifically against them in the cyberspace, otherwise collateral damage arising from any attack may nonetheless be unavoidable.
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Mapping involves the process of assessing the functions and blueprint of the 85 The Guidance itself has remained controversial because some scholars refused to accept it, and the major military powers have chosen to remain mute on its clarifications. 97 However, it remains useful in constructing a set of generally agreed parameters within which the debate about DPH can be conducted.
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To bring the discussion of the direct participation of civilians in hostilities within the purview of this paper bordering on cyber-attacks, it is worth noting that a good number of cyber-attacks are actually conducted by non-state actors. (1), (2), (3) and (6) Consol. T.S. 429. The armed forces as such are not defined, but 'militia and volunteer corps' fulfilling the conditions of being under responsible command, having a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly, and conducting operations in accordance with the LOAC, are considered equally to be combatants. 107 Prisoners of war are defined inter alia, as "members of the armed forces or of militias or volunteer corps forming part of the armed forces, and members of other militias (including organized resistance movements) that satisfy the requirements of Article 1 of The Hague Regulations: Article 4(A)(1)-(2), GC III, supra note 100. 108 Article 4 (4), GC III, supra note 100 (civilians authorised to accompany the armed forces in an international armed conflict who do not take a direct part in hostilities remain civilians for the purpose of targeting, although if captured, they may enjoy the status of prisoner of war). 109 Although such proof is usually very difficult to find, state victims may rely on 'imputed responsibility' 125 to sustain attribution of cyber-attacks arising from the territory a state, to that state. Imputed state responsibility is premised on the failure of the state to implement the duty to prevent its territory from being used to attack other states. 126 Therefore, where a state is indifferent as to the continuous use of its territory to conduct cyber-attacks and it fails to investigate such attack or prosecute the alleged attackers, a presumption of collaboration with the attackers is usually made against it, and the attacks may be impliedly attributed to the state.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have been able to uncover the fact that current IHL rules do not address the phenomena cyber-attack, cyber warfare and other allied issues. The increased number of cyber-attacks linked to non-state actors to which IHL does not apply exacerbates the problem posed by these concepts. Gone are the days when kinetic warfare was the principal method to cause massive destruction, injury and death.
Today, state and non-state actors (including civilian cyber warriors) fight in a different battlefield (cyberspace) where they use computer-generated weapons.
Thus, the very technologies that empower nations to lead and create a new world also empower people to disrupt and destroy the socio-economic system that relies Secondly, we found that the extant regime of IHL does not give room for belligerent acts in the cyberspace. In fact, the very definition of cyber-attack is devoid of any relationship with either jus ad bellum or jus in bello principles of humanitarian law. Thus, there is a need to reconstruct the laws of war to expand the notion of armed conflict to cover cyber warfare. To begin with, IHL must clearly define the elements of cyber-attack that would qualify cyber operations as armed attack in international law. The new definition should define the various types of cyber-attacks and be broad enough to incorporate new methods of cyber-attacks.
The benefit of such a clear but broad definition cannot be over-emphasised. put in place an environment that will deter both state and non-state actors, because a clear definition will enjoy legitimacy (which will in turn command compliance) and will clearly state what is prohibited. Again, the whole gamut of IHL will have to be reconstructed with cyber-attacks and cyber warfare in mind, especially regarding the jus in bello principles of necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity.
In the meanwhile, before the laws of war are modified to take cognisance of cyber-attacks, we recommend that states respond to transnational cyber-attacks by graduating their countermeasures on the basis of severity of the attacks. 133 Thus, mild attacks that are not illegal or do not rise to the level of use of force, could be responded to by use of non-forcible counter computer network attacks (CNA) that are commensurate in scale and effect to the initial CNA. Severe cyber-attacks that are elevated to use of force but do not reach the threshold of armed attack, may receive a counter response from an equivalent or proportional non-forcible counter CNA; while those elevated to armed attack may be met by an equal measure, in addition to a kinetic force option.
